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ABSTRACT: Multistable figures offer an intriguing model for arbitrating
conflicting positions. Moving back and forth between the different as-
pects under which something can be seen, one recognizes that mutually
contradictory descriptions can be equally valid and that disputes over the
correct account can be resolved without dissolving differences or estab-
lishing a higher synthesis. Yet, the experience of a gestalt switch also offers
a model for radical conversions and revolutions – that is, for irreversible
leaps to incommensurable alternatives foiling ideals of rational choice
while providing the possibility and necessity of decision. Accentuating the
temporal dimensions of multistable figures, this multidisciplinary volume
illuminates the critical potentials and limits of multistability as a complex
figure of thought.
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 7I N T R O D U C T I O N
INTRODUCTION
Christoph F. E. Holzhey
‘It’s a duck!’ – ‘It’s a rabbit!’ As long as interlocutors see only one 
aspect, they will engage in an endless dispute without approaching 
agreement. Once they recognize that the same image allows for differ-
ent, equally valid descriptions, they can quickly settle the dispute with-
out dissolving differences between conflicting accounts or establishing a 
higher synthesis. The experience of multistable figures or so-called Kipp-
bilder – the sudden and repeated ‘kippen’ (tilting, toppling, tipping, or 
flipping over) of perception as the same object is seen under different 
aspects – is fascinating in its own right. However, what animated the 
year-long discussion leading to this volume was a critical exploration of 
the proposition that such figures may offer a helpful model for thinking 
through the intercultural and interdisciplinary effort of productively 
negotiating between conflicting positions. 
 Here, in contrast to simple multistable figures, not only are we not 
limited to two aspects, but we also do not begin with well-circum-
scribed objects. Instead, the starting point consists of divergent descrip-
tions without prior knowledge as to whether they are equally valid. One 
or several descriptions could just be wrong or they could turn out to be 
referring to different objects or situations, so there is no contradiction 
between them. An answer can only be found through sustained conver-
sations and explorations, by recognizing different aspects and continu-
ously going back and forth between them – and not simply once and for 
all, but separately for specific situations and contexts. In this process, 
one might expect that false alternatives get eliminated, that differing 
positions get modified to approach each other, or that the conversation 
breaks off, leading to a differentiation of objects and approaches – that 
is, to different (sub)disciplines or (sub)cultures. 
 Arriving at a strict multistable figure with incompatible but equally 
valid descriptions is at best a rare and unexpected prospect. Maintain-
ing it as a possibility can help keep the conversation going and stop us 
from prematurely jumping to the conclusion that in being convinced of 
the validity of one position we must deny and reject the validity of con-
flicting positions. Positions that appear to be mutually exclusive may 
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just turn out to be different aspects of the same object or situation. 
However, assuming the applicability of this model to situations of con-
flict is equally problematic and risks leading to indifference – becoming 
at best indifferent to other perspectives, and at worse oblivious to forms 
of violence veiled and sustained by conciliatory equivocation. 
 Multistable figures can thus function in more complex and contra-
dictory ways than the initial scenario of conflict resolution may suggest. 
While we rarely seem to be confronted with situations where we can 
easily move from one aspect to another, imagining other ways of seeing, 
experiencing and living, making such alternatives visible, and realizing 
them in an irreversible manner is the task of revolutionaries – not only 
in politics, but also in art and even science. ‘What were ducks in the sci-
entist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards’, says 
Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, thereby indi-
cating that metaphoric uses of multistable figures are not bound to 
quiet coexistence but can also provide a model for turbulent, perhaps 
violent, and at any rate rationally uncontrollable transformations. 
 A large distance no doubt separates the rather small subset of opti-
cal illusions from the kind of epistemological, scientific, aesthetic, and 
political conflicts and tensions invoked by the contributions in this vol-
ume. The aim is certainly not to collapse the gap and to suggest, for 
instance, that social conflicts could be reduced to optical illusions and 
mere perceptual, subjective differences, let alone that they could be 
explained and resolved by multistable figures. The point is rather that 
thinking with multistable figures can have a critical potential when con-
flicts get redoubled on a perceptual and conceptual level. While conflict-
ing groups may agree on the reality of conflict, they may also engage in 
a mésentente on a different level, mishearing one another and replicat-
ing their conflict in a disagreement over how to conceptualize the con-
flict and its elements.1 Furthermore, conflict may reappear within each 
group not only because there is disagreement over political strategies, 
but also because the constitution of conflicting groups, possible alli-
ances, and necessary exclusions are at stake. Such multiple replication 
neither challenges the reality of conflict nor softens it, even if the lines 
of conflict keep shifting. On the contrary, it arguably points to the 
‘Real’ understood as the ‘traumatic core of some social antagonism’2 
and questions the possibility of coming to an understanding even 
among those who agree to rely on the force of the better argument 
rather than physical violence to deal with tensions and conflicts. What 
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should be cannot follow from what is, but also with similar aims and 
values, no agreement can be reached when one cannot even settle on an 
account of the situation and on a conceptualization of its problems. 
 Modern science seems to offer a model for rational progress even if 
it arguably seeks to secure its progress by agreeing to limit itself to that 
which it expects to be able to describe. The argument that even with 
this self-limitation, science faces incommensurable alternatives – such 
that science undergoes revolutions that have less to do with leaps of 
knowledge than with contingent choices of an ultimately social and 
political nature – resonated well with poststructuralist, deconstructive, 
and social constructivist approaches. After the end of the Cold War’s 
bipolarity, this argument played an important role in the so-called Sci-
ence Wars, which at their height reached public visibility through the 
Sokal affair in 1996.3 Later presented as an attempt to rescue the politi-
cal Left from a postmodern epistemic relativism that was supposedly 
dominating the human and social sciences,4 the Sokal hoax, it might be 
argued, struck a nerve, and its reverberations continue to be felt because 
the pluralization of incommensurable alternatives is increasingly per-
ceived to be complicit with a global neo-liberal capitalist order. Since 
then, the critical investment of questioning, destabilizing, and pluraliz-
ing categories of construction easily appears as scientifically soft and 
politically ineffective, and it seems to have given way to a yearning for 
the kind of solid answers that the hard sciences promise and religious 
fundamentalisms posit. In addition to a return to Marx, recent years 
have seen numerous post-linguistic turns – such as the emotional, affec-
tive, material or ontological turns – which allow the humanities and the 
social sciences to dialogue again more closely, though often defensively, 
with science and technology. 
 In this all-too-roughly sketched and certainly contestable context, 
multistable figures may offer a helpful model to think through the pos-
sibility of having incommensurable alternatives without promoting a 
radical constructivism, subjectivism, or relativism.5 They problematize 
fixed dichotomies between subject and object, reality and construction, 
epistemology and ontology, and natural and conventional categories; 
but rather than reducing, conflating or bridging them, they also make 
their discontinuities and ruptures both palpable and intelligible.
 In proposing multistable figures as a model with which to explore a 
situation of conflicting positions, the term ‘model’ is not meant in a 
normative sense as something to be emulated, but in the sense of a sci-
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entific model, which like a metaphor, provides an ‘instrument of rede-
scription’ and thus ‘belongs not to the logic of justification or proof, but 
to the logic of discovery’.6 The articles collected in this volume are thus 
especially concerned with critically exploring the implications of trans-
posing specific moments in the remarkably complex and multilayered 
phenomenology of multistable figures. They share a particular attention 
to temporal dimensions and collectively show how these figures can 
inspire thinking about multiple temporal figures – such as the now, the 
anticipated future, the reactivated past, or the always-already – and 
help conceptualize manifold temporalities, be they circular, eternal, sus-
pended, discontinuous, reversible, or irreversible. 
The first chapter highlights the Kipppunkt of Kippbilder (the moment 
of tilting, flipping, or toppling over – or indeed the tipping point – of 
multistable figures), but it also provides a vivid illustration for the com-
plex entanglement of different temporalities, dimensions, moments, and 
registers of nested Kippbilder, which later chapters will individuate and 
analyse in other contexts. In ‘KippCity’, Christine Hentschel explores 
the potential of multistable figures for conceptualizing urban change. 
This potential, she argues, lies in inspiring a particular way of looking, 
which manoeuvres between proximity and distance, complicates the 
relationship between fragment and whole, and allows for a strategy of 
estrangement and of searching for a critical perspective in the irreduci-
ble gap of the flip-moment itself. In Berlin-Neukölln, a neighbourhood 
long branded as poor and failing, multiple and partly conflicting flip-
scenarios have begun to inspire and haunt the neighbourhood and its 
self-reflective talk. KippCity Neukölln is thus a flickering figure. But 
unlike an artefact Kippbild, which flickers between duck and rabbit, for 
example, KippCity Neukölln does not simply tip into a new pre-fabri-
cated form, but rather wavers between different future scenarios. Neu-
kölln’s flickering urbanity is thus nervous, full of uncertainty, frustra-
tion and enthusiasm. The article shows how the neighbourhood seeks 
escape from the dystopia of two dominant flip scenarios of ghettoiza-
tion and gentrification by digging its claws into its now. While here the 
now may be enjoyed as a Kippbild that has two equally dystopic flip 
scenarios as its aspects – and that stays exciting as long as it is reversible 
and neither of its aspects is fully and irreversibly realized – ‘KippCity’ 
also highlights the fact that flips along axes other than the ghetto–gen-
trification pivot are necessary in order to do justice to the neighbour-
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hood’s diverse realities and address the complex factors that shape 
urban (im)mobility. 
 From the flickering now to timelessness: in the second chapter, 
Beau Madison Mount focuses on the ‘seeing-as’ structure of multistable 
figures, which he argues are distinct and independent from the phenom-
enon of aspect shifts – even if it may be empirically impossible to 
acquire the concept of aspect-seeing without having experienced aspects 
shift. His chapter ‘Aspects and Abstracta’ starts with a brief history of 
the philosophical interest in multistable figures since the nineteenth cen-
tury, suggesting that this ‘seeing-as’ structure is central in the most 
important philosophical treatment of multistable figures – Wittgen-
stein’s Philosophical Investigations – and can be generalized beyond 
concrete perception to the contemplation of abstract objects under an 
aspect. After a discussion of multistable figures in general and a few 
observations about concrete instances of seeing-as, Mount presents 
examples of the aspect-relative cognition of mathematical abstracta 
(thinking about a set of complex numbers as the base set of a group; 
conceiving of a series of sets under a number-aspect) and artefactual 
abstracta (understanding a sonnet in Raymond Queneau’s Cent mille 
milliards de poèmes under the aspects of two distinct artworks; inter-
preting poems based on homophonic translations under the aspects of 
two different languages so that ‘Un petit d’un petit’, for instance, would 
be read in French, but understood also as ‘Humpty Dumpty’ in Eng-
lish). The chapter concludes by suggesting that the possibility of the 
aspect-relative cognition of both mathematical and artefactual abstracta 
is important for realists about mathematical objects – that is, as the 
appendix further elucidates, for a mathematical platonism that insists 
on the existence of numbers, for instance. The appendix also further 
motivates the view that literary works are abstracta (abstract types of 
which specific copies are concrete tokens) and thus nonspatial and caus-
ally inert, even if they are ontologically dependent on human activities 
and thus in some sense also temporal. 
 The coming into existence of artefactual abstracta is perhaps as 
intricate to conceptualize as what can only improperly be called the first 
aspect change in the experience of a Kippbild. Strictly speaking, there is 
no first change of aspects, since it is only after this event that aspects are 
recognized as such. The so-called first aspect change introduces a dou-
ble split – between two aspects, but also between seeing and aspect-see-
ing – and it does so irreversibly, while all subsequent aspect changes can 
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be understood as an endless chain of reversible changes. In the third 
chapter, ‘Splitting Images: Understanding Irreversible Fractures through 
Aspect Change’, Luca Di Blasi argues that this complex combination of 
an eventful moment and an undirected repetition of the same makes 
Kippbilder an interesting model for understanding better dramatic, exis-
tential, and even religious events and their consequences. After discuss-
ing the specificity of the Rubin vase and its (inversional) aspect changes, 
which distinguish it from the duck-rabbit figure, he focuses on the 
eureka moment when a Kippbild is for the first time seen as a Kippbild 
and a ‘second’ aspect splits the originally perceived integrity or whole-
ness, relativizing it as a partial aspect. Consciously dramatizing the 
genealogical structure in view of a translation into an existential realm, 
he highlights the asymmetry between the first and second aspects, which 
may stand, respectively, for a lost wholeness and a divisive split. The 
subsequent, reversible aspect changes ensure that one avoids the totali-
tarian temptation of overcoming the irreversible split by taking one 
aspect for the whole. However, Di Blasi argues that being satisfied with 
an endless series of ultimately banal changes between mere aspects 
would be but another attempt – one that is more paradoxical, but ulti-
mately just as reductive – to get rid of the split as it was introduced by 
the first aspect change. The full complexity and potential of multistable 
figures as a model for radically transformative events, he insists, only 
comes out when one recognizes the difference between the first aspect 
change and subsequent changes, and keeps both the split and the desire 
to get rid of it. In the final section, the chapter elaborates this claim by 
discussing the conversion of Paul and his hōs mē (‘as if not’). 
 A kind of conversion scene with a Kippbild structure is also the 
focus of the fourth chapter, but the approach is in several ways flipped 
around, as it were. Pascale Gillot starts her chapter ‘The Munchausen 
Effect: Subjectivity and Ideology’ by situating her argument within a 
philosophical tradition that opposes philosophies of consciousness and 
rejects any supposed primacy of an originary subjectivity that would get 
transformed only subsequently through social interactions with others. 
Her focus lies on Louis Althusser’s theory of ideological interpellation 
and specifically the apparent Kippbild structure of the famous police-
hailing scene that Althusser describes in order to illustrate how the sub-
ject – far from being primary – is constituted as the result of being inter-
pellated as subject. The multistability linked to this event does not have 
to do with the outcome (which appears instead as a stable, integrated 
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subject), but rather with a logical circularity that makes reason oscillate 
between two sides of an antinomy: the subject is said to be constituted 
through the hailing, but one would think that there must already be a 
subject that recognizes itself as being hailed. Gillot proposes two ways 
of addressing this circle with the model of multistable figures or, follow-
ing Michel Pêcheux’s Althusserian analysis, with what has been 
described as the Munchausen effect in allusion to the story of Baron 
Munchausen pulling himself out of a pond by grasping his own hair. On 
one reading, the permanent oscillation between mutually exclusive posi-
tions – the subject as constituted versus the subject as pre-existing and 
constituting – is a symptom for ill-conceived premises, but these do not 
concern Althusser but rather the approaches for which he offers a radi-
cal critique: subjectivism, psychologism, and the idealist theory of the 
subject, which insist on the question of origin and paradoxically posit 
the subject as a cause of itself (causa sui). On another reading, the Kipp-
bild structure does apply to the subjectivation process insofar as it 
points to an irreducible contradiction upon which the subject is built. 
While subjectivism seeks to arrest the Kippbild structure through a 
reduction to the side of the constituting subject (but then re-encounters 
the structure in the paradoxical notion of causa sui), one might say that 
Althusser and Pêcheux perform a reduction to the side of the consti-
tuted subject, but at the same time account for the subject-effect as a 
necessary illusion that is produced in a complex temporality of anticipa-
tion, retroactiveness, and the necessary obliteration of the conditions of 
subject constitution. As result, both the subject’s split and its forgetting 
are emphasized here even more strongly, but also differently, namely as 
necessary and with an emphasis on constitution, causality, and freedom 
rather than on integrity, wholeness, and the desire to overcome the 
sense of their loss.
 While the Kippbild structure of a split subject may appear timeless 
and universal – regardless of whether it is linked to an individual’s con-
tingent conversion or to the necessity of ideology and to Althusser’s 
provocative assertion that ‘ideology has no history’ – the subsequent 
chapters turn to more specific historical and socio-cultural contexts. 
Benjamin Dawson suggests in the fifth chapter, ‘Cognition and Volition: 
Two Aspects of the Human in the Age of Experimental Systems’, that it 
is only in modernity that the human subject appears as a strict Kippbild 
with no mediation between its aspects. The transition to what he also 
calls the ‘age of anthropolarity’ is irreversible insofar as modernity can-
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not properly think of the process of its becoming, let alone of what 
came before. However, Dawson describes in a necessarily speculative 
manner the emergence of a Kippbild anthropolarity as a process of 
impoverishment and diminution rather than as a momentous event, and 
links it to an increasing indistinction of thought and life. In the first sec-
tion of the chapter, he sketches the complementary twentieth-century 
trends of ‘biologizing epistemology’ (especially Georges Canguilhem’s 
approach to a science of life, where life is both the object and subject of 
research) and ‘epistemologizing biology’ (especially the emergence of 
differential systems theory through an intertwining of biology and 
cybernetics) as a theoretical background for exploring the deeper impli-
cations of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s determination of experimental sys-
tems as living systems. In the second section, the chapter argues that the 
disappearance of the distinction between cognition and life has deeper 
roots going back to the eighteenth century. Dawson highlights in partic-
ular Kant’s temporalization of self-consciousness and cognition, which 
ultimately reduces science to life, or more precisely to a de-ontologized 
understanding of life as immanent and self-grounded on the operational 
management and reproduction of internal differences. As a result, the 
subject of knowledge is no longer a substance, but a transcendental dif-
ference reduced to managing and endlessly reiterating differences. The 
only substantial subjectivity left in Kant is the subject of practical rea-
son (volition), but it is entirely ineffectual and eclipsed by the biological 
imperative that the chapter’s last section links to Michel Foucault’s the-
ory of governmentality, which relies on a biological epistemology to 
conceptualize the shifts in society that took place around 1800. How-
ever, Dawson finally suggests in reference to Giorgio Agamben that 
rather than disappearing, volition absently remains and forms part of a 
‘bipolar machine’ in which neither side – volition and cognition, being 
and practice, substance and effectuality, theology and administration – 
is possible without the other, even if there is no longer any relationship 
of mediation between them. 
 If the Kippbild once again offers a model for a split subject, its 
structure appears here as an ‘emaciated dialectics’, that is, it appears as 
the result of a historical process that may well have started with Paul’s 
Christian conversion and have reached by now the point where a Kipp-
bild structure passes as a necessary effect of any ideology. Of course, the 
frameworks of chapters three to five are too different for them to be 
simply fitted together as highlighting three moments of the same his-
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tory. Although they are all to some extent concerned with a split sub-
ject, the axes of splitting differ, running between volition and cognition, 
between a constituting and constituted subject, or initially between dif-
ferent relativized identities but ultimately between a desire for integrity 
and a repetition of splitting. Nevertheless, a certain similarity can be 
discerned insofar as an asymmetric split is privileged, with one side 
being of the order of substance and the other of insubstantial identities 
or appearances that are non-originary, contingent, unstable, and relativ-
ized within a web of differences. Such a privileging does not contradict 
the possibility of multistability on the ‘insubstantial’ side, which is 
where one might expect the Kippbild model to be most directly applica-
ble. A reversible flipping between ontologically homogeneous aspects is 
indeed as conceivable for the subject as it was for the urban and 
abstract objects discussed in the first two chapters, but the other three 
chapters presented thus far more or less explicitly consider it as unsatis-
factory and as something to be escaped through an axial shift towards 
substantiality (conceived perhaps as a necessary illusion or desire). One 
possible background and historical context for this stance can be found 
in the debates about identity politics since the 1960s and the view that 
they are too caught up in pluralizing insubstantial differences, regard-
less of whether identity categories are politicized at the risk of essential-
izing them or whether their instability and fluidity is celebrated. These 
debates could now seem to have been decided and identity politics dis-
credited on account of its substantialization of socially contingent con-
structions. However, while one avenue is then to seek a better concep-
tion of the register of substance, another is to pursue other understand-
ings of identity politics through a re-examination of its history and the 
concerns it addressed. 
 The sixth chapter, ‘Identity Politics Redux’, focuses on a case study 
of queer feminist pornography to show that identity politics and its 
debates continue to be relevant in contemporary queer activist practice. 
K. Heintzman begins by reviewing some key aspects of the debates, 
including controversies with coalition politics, the role of language, 
labelling, and bodily materiality, and queer theory’s distinction between 
identity and identification. The argument here is that the manifold criti-
cisms of identity politics collectively appear contradictory, and that 
advocates and critics of ‘identity politics’ may ultimately disagree pri-
marily over the term’s definition, while having much in common in 
terms of political strategies and concerns. There is, for instance, the 
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sense that problems of exclusion and of wrongly presuming similarities 
that would unite people hold for either side of the debates, as does the 
danger of participating in the oppression that is attacked; and con-
versely, there is the sense that those who defend identity boundaries are 
as right as those who seek to mobilize and dismantle these boundaries. 
With regard to the position emphasizing processes of identification and 
the fragmented, fluid, and always provisional character of all identities, 
Heintzman suggests that it may just as well be considered a case of anti-
identity politics as of identity politics. One could add here that while 
these debates may be thought of in terms of multistability and include a 
critical reflection on the proliferation of differences, a subject’s reversi-
ble switching between different identities does not seem to play a role, 
nor, for that matter, does a substantialization of identity. Rather, it is 
identity politics that appears multistable; or more to the point, it is 
experiences of difference, oppression, and marginalization, as well as 
strategies for responding to them effectively that appear multistable 
when representation and conceptualization are attempted. Turning to 
Shine Louise Houston’s ‘pomo-homo-docu-mockumentary’, The Wild 
Search, the chapter offers a close and subtle reading that individuates 
the multiple and shifting aspects under which viewers may see naked 
bodies on screen, depending on their cultural literacy of queerness, and 
on the way they filter information from the visual and linguistic field. 
The chapter argues that the film intervenes in queer theory through 
strategies of misappellation and silence (for instance, through the unreli-
able self-identified heterosexual documentary filmmaker within the 
film, who aggressively marks bisexual, gender-variant, and raced bodies 
as lesbian) that play with the audience’s persistent investment in conver-
sations on identity politics, while offering a critique of identity categori-
zation and allowing for the possibility of reappropriating and reimagin-
ing desire.
 A multistable and persistently relevant kind of identity politics is 
also at issue in the next chapter, which moves to quite a different discur-
sive context, and extends the historical horizon to World War II, shift-
ing the focus from individual to national identity. Against the historical 
revisionism launched by the former Yugoslav republics since the 1990s, 
Gal Kirn insists on the importance and complexity of maintaining the 
radicalness of the revolutionary event that was the partisan struggle 
during World War II. He criticizes the dominant approach to nation 
building, which supplements nationalism with an anti-totalitarian 
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humanistic ideology that seeks reconciliation by placing Yugoslav com-
munists as well as World War II fascists, local collaborators, and parti-
sans on the same level – that is, as merely different aspects of totalitari-
anism and war. Against the mobilization of such a conciliatory Kipp-
bild, which remains compatible with a rehabilitation of fascist 
collaborators and an amnesia of the anti-fascist legacy in post-Yugoslav 
memory politics, Kirn insists on the partisan difference. He argues for a 
partisan return to the partisan struggle and for the necessity for 
researchers to recover the political history of the oppressed in a partisan 
way, that is, by taking sides. The partisanship of the seventh chapter, 
‘Multiple Temporalities of the Partisan Struggle: From Post-Yugoslav 
Nationalist Reconciliation Back to Partisan Poetry’, is not due to a priv-
ileging of something of the order of substance. On the contrary, the 
chapter faults not only the memory politics of nationalist reconciliation 
but also that of Yugonostalgia for seeking and mythologizing national 
substance in a unified archive. It suggests that they form a Kippbild 
with equally objectionable aspects, and argues that both discourses 
share Romantic assumptions about the temporality of the Nation and 
history as a closed process. The partisan struggle, by contrast, manifests 
a ruptured and open temporality, as the main part of the chapter shows 
through a close analysis of partisan poetry that emerged during the par-
tisan struggle in World War II. The special, multiple temporality of this 
poetry hinges on the productive and tensed relationship between the 
‘not yet existing’ – a new society that is not only free of foreign occupa-
tion, but also radically transformed – and the contemporary struggle 
during the war. Moreover, this temporality of a ‘futur antérieur’ is 
marked by the fear that the rupture of the struggle might not be rightly 
remembered, or not remembered at all. The memory of the struggle is 
thus a task to be realized, not only for poets, but for everyone partici-
pating in the struggle. 
 While also highlighting the necessity of deciding and taking sides, 
the eighth chapter emphasizes that this necessity keeps arising and is 
central for an understanding of political agency and its conditions. Enti-
tled ‘Figuring Ambivalence, Capturing the Political: An Everyday Per-
spective’, it focuses on the notion of ambivalence to explore the intri-
cate conditions and dynamics of everyday decision-making. In the first 
part, Brigitte Bargetz sketches how Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, 
Homi Bhabha, and Antke Engel use different figures of ambivalence in 
order to critique assumptions of political coherence, closure, and deter-
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minism. With different emphases, these approaches mobilize ambiva-
lence as a figure of multiplicity that highlights political potentialities 
and the possibility of agency beyond identity politics. At the same time, 
the authors discussed go beyond an uncritical affirmation of multiplicity 
insofar as they highlight the role of power relations and structures, and 
problematize, for instance, the privatization of ambivalence, the burden 
of having to decide, and the simultaneous demands of freedom and 
responsibility imposed on the neoliberal subject. Bargetz suggests that 
the model of multistable figures captures this double aspect of ambiva-
lence insofar as this model evokes multiplicity but is more constrained 
and structured, involving a situation of undecidability but also the 
necessity to decide – if only temporarily. Noting that in paradigmatic 
Kippbilder the structural constraints go too far, she suggests combining 
the figures of multiplicity and multistability. The second part of the 
chapter explores the double aspect of ambivalence by turning to Henri 
Lefebvre’s theory of the everyday and his emphasis on praxis as the 
requirement for making decisions. In particular, Bargetz works out a 
distinction between ambiguity and ambivalence, which are often used 
interchangeably, such that the complex structure and temporality of 
decision-making may be captured by the formula ‘ambivalence = ambi-
guity + decision’. Ambiguity here denotes a plurality of potentialities 
that can co-exist with indifference. Ambivalence, by contrast, is tightly 
bound to practice and to the (imposed) need to decide. The two notions 
are part of a tightly interrelated assemblage with an intricate temporal-
ity that goes beyond joining the reversible flickering of possibilities with 
the necessity of making an irreversible decision: ambiguity keeps return-
ing but cannot endure, and it therefore appears to be constantly inter-
rupted through decisions and actions; ambivalence, in turn, is both the 
suspension of ambiguity and its unfolding, and it is only through 
ambivalence that ambiguity and the power relations underlying the 
whole assemblage become manifest. The chapter concludes by suggest-
ing that such a theorization of ambiguity and ambivalence as an interre-
lated assemblage constituted through practices reflects a materialist, 
process-oriented understanding of the political, and accounts for the 
contradictory conditions that subjects both encounter and shape. 
 Bargetz’s chapter could be said to respond to the Munchausen 
effect of the subject’s constitution by partially shifting it to social condi-
tions so as to arrive at a mutual constitution through practices without 
turning either the subject or the socio-political into a determining, 
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always-already pre-existing stable ground of the order of substance. The 
emphasis on (insubstantial) multiplicity, which is perhaps stronger than 
in the chapters highlighting the persistence of historical contingencies 
and the necessity for a partisan recovery of singular historical events, 
indicates the limits of taking the Kippbild as a model for decision-mak-
ing. However, the model of multistable figures may once again regain a 
productive potential if one decides to flip axes to construct a Kippbild 
oscillating between conceptual aspects that one considers to be in con-
flict but equally indispensable, such as multiplicity and multistability, 
potentiality and structure, or possibility and constraint. There is no 
need here to link one of the sides with a substantial dimension that 
would lead to an ontological splitting, but the alternatives can be con-
ceived precisely as aspects. In this case, they are aspects of the interre-
lated assemblage of ambivalence and ambiguity, which unfolds a certain 
doubling of ambivalence – one could also say ‘an ambivalence of 
ambivalence’ – and is bound up with an intricate semi-circular tempo-
rality of retroactively constituted conditions, of anticipated realization 
in the mode of the ‘futur antérieur’, and of suspense. 
 In this spirit, the ninth and final chapter reflects on the multistable 
use of multistable figures, and maps out some of the possibilities that 
are discussed with different emphases throughout the volume. It seeks 
to think through the possibilities of transposing specific moments in the 
phenomenology of paradigmatic Kippbilder – such as the duck-rabbit – 
to other phenomena while disregarding other moments. The point is not 
to be content with an analogy – as if it could explain anything – but 
rather to make the transposition productive by suggesting possibilities 
in the field of analogy that one might not otherwise imagine, and 
thereby to raise questions for further exploration in that field. Like any 
other toy model, the Kippbild model can certainly not be expected to do 
justice to the full complexity of the phenomena of interest, but at most 
to a particular aspect or only after some extension – such as abstracting, 
for example, from the psychophysiology of grasping one visual gestalt 
rather than another to a more generalized sense of comprehending 
something under an aspect. Entitled ‘Oscillations and Incommensurable 
Decisions: On the Multistable Use of Multistable Figures’, the chapter 
starts with Joseph Jastrow’s ‘The Mind’s Eye’ (1899), which highlights 
an active, subjective dimension of seeing and is a source for Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s famous conceptual analysis of the duck-rabbit figure. 
After some reflections on multistable physical systems, where multista-
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bility is not a matter of perception but of material processes with com-
plex, non-linear dynamics, Christoph F. E. Holzhey focuses on the mul-
tifaceted and ambiguous uses of multistable figures in Thomas Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in order to identify and explore 
different temporal moments in multistable figures. In addition to a 
period of reversibility, there is also an initial, irreversible aha-experience 
and the possibility of making different kinds of decisions about how to 
act – irreversibly – upon reversibility in particular contexts: committing 
to one aspect at the expense of others, deciding whether to engage in 
such a forced choice at all rather than suspend the oscillation and/or 
move in an altogether different direction, or admitting an irreducible 
multistability. 
This volume is an outcome of the research project ‘Kippbilder/Multista-
ble Figures as Models for Tension/Spannung’ conducted in 2010–11 at 
the ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry. It is the result of an inten-
sive year-long exchange among the contributors, other ICI fellows 
(Catherine Diehl, Giovanni Frazzetto, and Aaron Schuster) and staff 
members (Claudia Peppel and Manuele Gragnolati), as well as conver-
sations with associate members (Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, Sara For-
tuna, Agnese Grieco, Liora Lazarus, Fatima Naqvi, Hania Siebenp-
feiffer, and Ming Tiampo) and fellows who came to ICI Berlin for the 
subsequent project ‘Multistable Figures and Complementarity’ (Ana-
heed Al-Hardan, Bobby Benedicto, Zeynep Bulut, David Kishik, San-
drine Sanos, and Volker Woltersdorff). In addition to numerous lec-
tures, workshops, and conferences organized within the framework of 
the research focus ‘Multistable Figures’ and the overarching core project 
‘Tension/Spannung’ (for an overview, see the Institute’s website at www.
ici-berlin.org), two further volumes in the series Cultural Inquiry belong 
to the same research context: Sara Fortuna’s Wittgensteins Philosophie 
des Kippbilds: Aspektwechsel, Ethik, Sprache (2012) and The Scandal 
of Self-Contradiction: Pasolini’s Multistable Subjectivities, Traditions, 
Geographies, ed. by Luca Di Blasi, Manuele Gragnolati, and Christoph 
F. E. Holzhey (2012). 
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N O T E S
1 Cf. Jacques Rancière, La Mésentente: Politique et philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 
1995); in English as Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. by Julie Rose 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 
2 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 26. 
Drawing on Levi-Strauss’s reflection on ‘the Winnebago discrepancy’ – which 
could be considered as a kind of multistable figure: the dual representation of a 
village’s dual organization – Žižek here develops his notion of the ‘parallax Real’ 
as ‘that which accounts for the very multiplicity of appearances of the same 
underlying Real’ (ibid.). 
3 A short account of the Sokal hoax can be found in the introduction to Alan 
Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ 
Abuse of Science (New York: Picador, 1998). In 1996 the physicist Alan Sokal 
submitted an article on the social construction of quantum gravity to the 
renowned journal Social Text. He wrote it as ‘a parody of the type of work that 
has proliferated in recent years […] chock-full of absurdities and blatant non-
sequiturs’ (pp. 1–2). After the article was accepted and published, he revealed the 
hoax, unashing a fierce debate that is partially documented in The Sokal Hoax: 
The Sham That Shook the Academy, ed. by the editors of Lingua Franca (Lin-
coln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).
4 Sokal and Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense, p. 206.
5 Multistable figures may thus form a useful model for re-thinking ‘post-construc-
tivism’ or ‘post-constructionism’, which engages in ‘a double – embracing and 
critical – approach to constructionism’, with the prefix ‘post’ signifying ‘both 
“transgressing” and “including”’ (Nina Lykke, ‘The Timeliness of Post-Con-
structionism’, NORA – Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 18.2 
(2010), pp. 131–36 (p. 133)). For the notion of post-constructivism, see for 
instance Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, ‘Visual Representation and Post-Constructivist 
History of Science’, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 
28.1 (1997), pp. 139–71 and the review essay by Joseph Rouse, ‘Vampires: 
Social Constructivism, Realism, and Other Philosophical Undead’, History and 
Theory, 41 (2002), pp. 60–78. 
6 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation 
of Meaning in Language (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 284. 
Ricoeur here refers to Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1962) and Mary B. Hesse, ‘The Explanatory Function of 
Metaphor’, in Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 157–77. 
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